We modified the multi-agent negotiation test-bed which was proposed by Collins et al. In 2004, Jaiswal et al. have 
Introduction
In 2002, Collins et al. presented a multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi-Agent Negotiation Test-bed) for electronic business-to-business market [1] . Jaiswal et al. proposed security protocol and put it into real-world networks and analyze security problem to improve MAGNET in 2004 [2] . The proposed major modification is the use of a publish/subscribe system by the market to notify the agents about the auctions. Also they adopted time-release cryptography to guarantee non-disclosure of the bids and anonymous communication to hide the identities of the bidders. According to this, the MAGNET is improved in security. But the improved protocol still has some weaknesses: vulnerable to the replay data attack, DOS (denial-of-service) attack, anonymity disclosure weakness, collusion between a customer and a certain supplier.
The proposed protocol utilizes ticket token to restrict download, also market generates deal sequence number (dsn) and random number (r) for suppliers who have download requests for quotes (RFQ). It utilizes efficient LPN-based authentication method to accomplish lightweight authentication. When auction is closed, market constructs a simple interpolating polynomial for sharing the determination process data in supplier group who have taken part in this auction. Sharing the determination process data can totally avoid collusion between a customer and a certain supplier.
In 2003, Chang et al. proposed an anonymous auction protocol, they applied a simple method for ensuring anonymity of bidders, and it also provided some important properties of auction protocol [3] . However, Jiang et al. found there were still some weaknesses in initial phase of Chang et al.'s protocol, so they improved it and proved its security in 2005 [4] . Because computation cost is not taken into account in their improvement, Chang et al. proposed the enhancement with the alias in their protocol and analyzed the computation cost in 2006 [5] . Another protocol which provides auction properties was proposed by Liaw et al. in 2006 . By comparison with Hwang et al.'s protocol [6] , they indicate that their protocol has strong security and more efficient [7] . By comparative analysis with those protocols, the proposed protocol shows good security and less computation cost.
Jaiswal's protocol and its vulnerabilities

Jaiswal's protocol
We introduce Jaiswal et al.'s protocol briefly. It contains planning, bidding, auction close and winner determination phase.
Planning
The customer sends a signed RFQ message ( ) kc S S RFQ to the market for publishing. S kc is secret key of the customer.
Bidding
The supplier receives the RFQ through the publish/subscribe system. If interested, the supplier generates a bid-message comprising of three parts: the RFQ number and a random number (RFQ#, r), auction-session key: a symmetric session key K a , bid data.
It then signs and encrypts the message and sends it to the market:
TE means a time-release encryption method. For all the bid-messages received by the market, it publishes (RFQ#, (r, hash(M))) on the publish/subscribe system, where M is the bid-message sent by a supplier to the market. The supplier can also check the publish/subscribe system and verify that whether its bid was actually received and displayed by the market. The customer can then retrieve the bids from the publish/subscribe system. However, it cannot access the bid data unless it decrypts the time-release cryptography [8] , the supplier agent would construct a puzzle that would take the customer longer than the auction deadline to solve.
Auction close
Once the auction is closed, the suppliers would release k a to the market in an encrypted form, along with the customer's copy: 
2.1.4.Winner determination
The customer agent uses various algorithms to determine the winner from the bids it has received. Once the winner has been determined, it would use the market's white-board to notify suppliers In message M', RFQ# is the current RFQ number and other data blocks are old data blocks. The market just publish (RFQ#, (r', hash(M')), and the supplier can check the hash value of M'. Because the legitimate supplier doesn't take part in this bid process, he will not pay attention to the publish message. Moreover, because of the time-release encryption of message, the market cannot know the identities of the suppliers, also he cannot verify the integrity and freshness of this message. When auction is closed, the attacker sends message E' pkm (S sks (k a ,r) ), E' pkc (S sks (k a ,r)) to market. Because r and k a are uniform with the former replay messages, market cannot verify whether this message is a replay data or not, and the case of the customer is similar with market. Only after the customer decrypts data and checks the bid data carefully, he might identify whether this message is replay data or not.
Customer collusion
The customer determines a winner from messages he has received. We assume that customer take sides with a certain supplier. After customer knew all suppliers' identities, customer only choose his partner supplier, without considering other suppliers, which is unfair to the others in process. So we should have a mechanism to inform the other suppliers of the bid determination process data to avoid collusions.
Security assumptions
In Jaiswal et al.'s protocol they proposed some trust assumptions for market as follows: 1 Conveys RFQs from customer to supplier agents 2 Communicates the bids from supplier agent back to customer agent 3 keep records of all the transactions of RFQs and bids 4 aggregates statistical data to ensure non-repudiation Also they propose some trust assumptions for three-party as follows: A customer agent will not collude with any of the supplier agents B customer agent communicates with the supplier agents only through the market.
But in our proposed scheme, we do not need to follow the trust assumptions of Jaiswal et al.'s protocol for three-party. In our proposed protocol, it is impossible if a customer wants to collude with a supplier. Also we allow the customer agent communicating with the supplier agents to exchange information. We will introduce how we can relax these trust assumptions for three-party in later section.
Proposed architecture
Key techniques
Ticket token
For our auction scheme, we need a secure authentication system for group communication. Not only authentication, we also need a mechanism to protect identities of participant in supplier group. So we import the concept of Conference key distribution into our auction scheme. The concept of conference key distribution was first proposed by Ingemarrsson et al. [9] . In 2005, Ryu et al. showed incompleteness of another scheme and improved it by adding verification phase [10] . Because of adopting publish/subscribe system we are going for anonymity primarily, not just for the mutual authentication. In our situations, it is more important that the identities of the suppliers participating in an auction procedure are hidden from other attending suppliers. Furthermore, the participant suppliers should be anonymous to market and customer. Also ticket token can help avoid DOS attack to some extent.
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LPN-based authentication
At first, we introduce the Learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. The LPN problem with security parameters q, k,η. Let A be a random q*k binary matrix, let x be a random k-bit vector, letη be a constant noise parameter, whereη∈[0, 1/2], and let v be a q-bit vector such that |v|≦ηq. Given A,η, and z=A·x⊕v, find a k-bit vector x' such that |A·x'⊕z|≦ηq. The hardness of the computational LPN problem has been shown to be NP-complete [11] . Several authentication protocols based on LPN problem were proposed, and most representative of them were HB protocol and HB + protocol [12] . Also Gilbert proposed that HB + is not secure against a man-in-the-middle attack [13] . When we import the LPN-based authentication into our auction scheme, we are going to show that the man-in-the-middle attack will not happen during the communication of market and suppliers. The two k-bit vectors x and y are secret keys shared by the market and a supplier S, where S denotes identity of the supplier. fig.1 The condition when HB + protocol attack happen is that the attacker can manipulate challenges sent by the market to a supplier during the authentication message exchanges. In our LPN-based authentication process, market utilizes publish system to show the message which suppliers have sent, so suppliers can check and verify whether their own data message was actually received and displayed by market. We assume that there is an attacker in the middle, and he can manipulate the message sent by a supplier to the market. Because of the publish system, the attacker cannot manipulate the challenges published by the market. According to what is mentioned above, the attacker doesn't have any opportunity to disturb the authentication process. 
4.2.Proposed scheme
The proposed protocol has the following phases: planning, bidding, auction close and winner determination, fig.2 illustrates the proposed protocol, as explained in the following:
For convenience, we assume there are n 1 customers and n 2 suppliers and one market in our auction scheme. In order to guarantee the reliability and safety among market, customer group and supplier group, we need a certification authority (CA) in key pre-distribution long-term key process.
CA chooses and publishes large prime number p 1 , p 2 such that p 1 -1 and p 2 -1 have large prime factors. Let q 1 be a prime divisor of p 1 -1 and g 1 be a generator with order q 1 in GF(p 1 ), q 2 be a prime divisor of p 2 -1 and g 2 be a generator with order q 2 in GF(p 2 ). Let S be the identity of the supplier, C be the identity of the customer. By using the Diffie-Hellman scheme, CA assigns a secret key x i 1 ∈Z * q 1 and computes public key gives the symmetric secret key x i 3 and y i 3 to each supplier and market in a secure way.
Planning
A customer sends a RFQ message which is signed by his secret key S kc to market for publishing. After receiving the RFQ message, market verify and publish it. After that, Market performs the following steps to construct ticket token polynomial: 
Bidding
If a supplier S is interested in this auction session, S will 1 Get A, B, t, c n-1 ,c n-2 ,……c 1 ,c 0 from market's publish board. 2 Check the timestamp t is a valid data or not. A *y p  After getting T, the supplier use the ticket token T to download RFQ. When a legitimate supplier downloads the RFQ, market generates dsn and r to the supplier. After getting dsn and r from market, the supplier generates a bid-message comprising of RFQ number (RFQ#), dsn and r, symmetric auction-session key (k a ), bid data (bid). Then he signs, hashes and encrypts the message (M) and sends M to market. Where M= [RFQ#,dsn, 
hash(r,dsn), E ka (S Sks (bid)) ,hash(r,E ka (S Sks (bid)))], S Sks (bid)
is a bid data block signed by supplier's secret key S ks . After receiving messages came from suppliers, Market publishes all (RFQ#, (dsn, M, hash(M))) on publish board. Suppliers can check and verify whether their own bid-message was actually received and displayed by market.
Auction close
When the auction is closed, market authenticate supplier's agent by using LPN authentication method. After that, market publishes notice which announced whether the supplier's agent passes the authentication or not. If passed, supplier's agent send S Sks (dsn, r, x i 3 ⊕y i 3 ⊕K a ), after receiving it, market publishes dsn, r, x i 3 ⊕y i 3 ⊕K a . Suppliers can check and verify whether their messages were actually ((dsn 1 ,r 1 ,k a 1 ),……(dsn i ,r i ,k a i ) ,……(dsn n ,r n ,k a n )), where E p kc () is encrypted by customer's public key. According to the message market published, customer download corresponding M from the publish/subscribe system and decrypt data block and get all valid bid information. Having authenticated supplier group twice, market can make sure that he would publish valid supplier's information.
Winner determination
The customer determines a winner and sends message S Skc (RFQ#, r winder ) to inform market winner information. After market receiving the customer's message, market checks whether the winner contained in legal supplier list (dsn 1 ,r 1 ,k a 1 ),……(dsn i ,r i ,k a i ) ,……(dsn n ,r n ,k a n ). If the winner is contained in the list, market publishes the winner information on board for notifying suppliers. If there is a controversy about winner, market will choose a large prime number p and a primitive element g for GF(p), where GF(p) is the set of integers {0,1, … ,p − 1} with arithmetic operations defined modulo p. Proof. The hardness of the computational LPN problem has been shown to be NP-complete [11] . Our LPN-based authentication method adopted HB + computing prototype. Even though Gilbert proposed that HB + is not secure against a man-in-the-middle attack [13] , because our auction scheme inherits the idea of publish system, we can make sure that the process of authentication is secure and sets up mutual authentication.
The condition when HB + protocol attack happen is that the attacker can manipulate challenges sent by the market to a supplier during the authentication message exchanges. In our LPN-based authentication process, market utilizes publish system to show messages which suppliers have sent. So suppliers can check and verify whether their own messages were actually received and displayed by market. We assume that there is an attacker in the middle, and he can manipulate the message sent by a supplier to the market. But the attacker cannot modify any information, because the supplier can check the message on board each round. Due to the publish system, the attacker cannot manipulate the challenges published by the market. According to what is mentioned above, the attacker doesn't have any opportunity to disturb the authentication process. 
It means that the attacker must solve the intractable discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, the attacker certainly cannot reconstruct the polynomial F(x) to get the session key K from there n points (1, F i (1) ), (2, F i (2) ),……,and (n, F i (n)) only.
By Theorem 1 we conclude that no one can get ticket token to take part in auction session besides supplier group. By Theorem 2 we conclude that market can make sure that the message which contained bid information comes from legal supplier group, also supplier can check whether market receive it very well. By theorem 3 we conclude after finished LPN authentication method, mutual 
Conclusions
As mentioned above, the current paper demonstrated that the proposed electronic marketplace bidding auction protocol relieves DOS attack on market to some extent, protects supplier anonymity, provides sealed bid with independent private values and avoids collusion among parties. Also it satisfies the security requirements of an electronic auction, such as anonymity, non-repudiation, verifiability etc. And the proposed scheme relaxes some trust assumptions for three-party in Jaiswal's scheme. According to the discussion and analysis with Chang et al.'s protocol and Liaw et al.'s protocol, our proposed protocol needs less computation cost in initiation phase and bidding phase, and has better security in anonymity, fairness and reliance on the third party. Therefore, the advantages of our proposed bidding auction protocol are that collusion will be difficult and computation cost is low.
